I have no idea how much credibility this story really has, but it's an interesting (and hair-raising) account of diseases accidentally released from research labs. Yikes.

http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/04/11/...-a-lab-mistake/

Reading the article, Jeff Goldblum's famous line from the movie Jurassic Park ran through my mind: "Life finds a way." Actually, that whole movie is a commentary on this article. The combination of human hubris and the persistent ability of living things to survive and thrive is a deadly combination when it comes to virulent diseases.

I have read about some of the things mentioned in the article, such as the 1977 H1N1 influenza release and the SARS incident, so I think the article is credible. Certain famous incidents such as the release of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union in 1979 that killed at least 100 people was not mentioned, though, so not a complete history of all the biggest releases.

The same researchers today who have created doomsday strains of H5N1 influenza virus are probably just as confident as the scientists in the past that they can keep their creations safely ensconced in their labs. Now that the deadliest strain of Ebola, the Zaire strain, is currently terrorizing West Africa for the first time, it's a good reminder of what happens when a deadly pathogen runs loose in a population.

Laboratories are run by humans, who are not perfect. Sometimes they mess up royally. But put this in perspective. How many lives have been saved, debilitating illnesses averted, and productive time saved by these same laboratories?

I don't have the answer to that question...Anyone??

I read that link and could not help but think of the opening chapters in Stephen King's "The Stand" novel.

A disease like the Black Death killed anywhere from a third to two-thirds of the population of Europe. What if something like that were artificially created--just "to study"--and escaped into the wild? Is that kind of accident ever justified? We're talking about horrible diseases that would not even exist except for our tinkering. We've resurrected the Spanish Flu from the permafrost. We've created super strains of the H5N1 avian flu that are lethal and easily spread and that no human has any immunity to. And I'm just talking about academic/university labs, since those seem the most vulnerable to accidents (but maybe that's only because those accidents are more likely to be reported than accidents in government/military labs?)

The world faced a similar decision point after the Fukushima meltdown in terms of risk/benefit. Advanced countries like Germany and Japan have essentially turned away from nuclear power as a result (although we'll see if those decisions can endure in light of our power needs and energy costs).

The movie Contagion touched on this issue, too. If you remember, the CDC told an academic researcher to shut down his lab's work on the influenza virus once they determined how deadly it was so the work could be moved to a highly secure lab. Yes, they could work faster than a more secure lab, but at what risk of it getting out in a different location and sparking a new epidemic? It's a question that is always hanging over this kind of work.

Edit: Before I come across as totally anti-science, I just wanted to clarify that I don't mean this issue to be all-or-none. As the article points out, since history has shown that it is "when" not "if" these organisms get out, perhaps there should be more debate about whether certain organisms should not be handled in the lab in the first place. For example, there was quite a bit of debate in the scientific community whether work to create a super strain of H5N1 should take place at all because of the risk of an accidental release into the wild.

I was just reading that the world famous Pasteur Institute in France just announced that it could not find 29 vials containing SARS samples. Subsequent searches and audits by third parties could not turn up the missing vials either. Supposedly no complete virus particles were in these vials, but even so, it is a serious breach for a lab of this caliber to lose that many vials from a dangerous pathogen.

It was pretty clear that the author of the original article was advocating for an "elimination" agenda. The list of accidents was certainly scary enough -- quite a few jaw-dropping whiskey tango foxtrots in there.

A couple of perspectives are perhaps worth considering.

First, realpolitik: the thinking is, if the other major rival power has it, you need to have it. That's madness, but it's mutually assured madness. The hope is, I suppose, to keep rogues and zealots from going too far. Politics and poker.

Second, and most important, the real realpolitik: bacteria, viruses, and phytoplankton really run this planet's habitable zones. Plants and insects are the next level of overlords. We humans, for all our bluster, are just along for the ride (or are expedient chauffeurs that move our uber-bosses to new territories, which include other autonomous biological systems, ecosystems, and possibly planets). And there isn't a dam_ thing we can do about it. Though keeping a few of history's worst offenders available for study might give us an edge when the overlords come up with something new, which they certainly will.

Yeah, I think it's presumptuous and premature to say we've "wiped out" even polio and smallpox. Not much more cases in the wild but we should keep them for study.