Originally Posted By: Eric

Reading through things it looks to me like this will end up reading like a typical aviation accident report, lots of indicators and opportunities to prevent the accident upstream of the final critical bit of bad luck/decision making.

Indeed - change a few words and it's going to look like an NTSB report.

There were two or three tests in the morning indicating a leak and (maybe) one late in the day saying no leak. Then they went ahead anyway. Why?

Maybe they were extraordinarily dumb - but maybe just "ordinarily dumb". Perhaps that's standard practice to test until you get the answer you want.

Or is that test so unreliable that experience has taught them that when other (unmentioned in the reports) tests in the days before are good that false positives are that common? Are false negatives rare compared to false positives?

Oilfield workers are not renowned for broad strategic thinking. Who made the decision to go ahead? Was there proper supervision? Was there a designated "safety officer" and firm criteria for referring decisions back to shore?

Finally it's important not to hang BP until we're sure this isn't business-as-usual across the entire industry. Nothing in the reports I've seen so far suggests their procedures were out of the ordinary.