For one thing, a trigger lock does not fully disable a firearm. It will take someone who knows what they are doing about 15 seconds to overcome the device.

But more to the point, if a pilot does not need a functional firearm outside of the cockpit, then either leave the pistol there, or else unload it and lock it in a hard case. Anyone who thinks that is too inconvenient is just plain lazy.

Actually, one clarifying point that I am not sure about and haven't seen anything written about is whether the pilot actually has to leave the holstered weapon in the cockpit. Like I said, they used to use a gun safe in the cockpit before, so I would assume that they're still supposed to physically remove the locked holster from their belt when they leave the cockpit. Just another layer of defense if the cockpit is rushed while the door is unlocked. Some would argue that simply leaving the weapon in the cockpit should be sufficient, but the holster lock adds a time delay if someone ever did make it into the cockpit and found the weapon. They couldn't just grab it and immediately start firing with it--well, unless the lock is attached in front of the trigger, that is.

CCRKBA CALLS FOR INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF IN-FLIGHT GUN MISHAP TO PREVENT COVER-UP

BELLEVUE, WA – The Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms today is calling for an independent investigation of an in-flight discharge of a pistol carried by an armed U.S. Airways pilot to prevent any whitewashing, cover-up or scapegoating in the incident.

CCRKBA Chairman Alan Gottlieb said the incident is alarming because of allegations that the pilot may have been following strict Transportation Security Administration (TSA) rules when the mishap occurred. Those rules came under fire today from the Airline Pilots Security Alliance (APSA), which represents thousands of commercial airline pilots.

“We have a keen interest in this case because we were first to demand that airline pilots be allowed to carry sidearms in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack,” Gottlieb stated. “We called for that measure just hours after four terrorist-commandeered jets hurtled out of the sky, killing thousands of Americans in New York, Washington, DC and a Pennsylvania field on that horrible day in 2001, and that must never happen again.

“But from the outset,” he continued, “TSA officials resisted the Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) program, with bureaucratic red tape and requirements that defy logic in terms of recruiting as many pilots as possible. Rules and red tape actually discouraged would-be volunteers. Professional pilots who are trusted to safely fly millions of passengers across our skies should be just as trustworthy to defend their aircraft from takeover. This incident could be used to erode public support for the FFDO program, which would be insane. There may or may not be an armed Federal Air Marshal aboard an airplane, but you are guaranteed there is a pilot on board.

“Today, we are calling for an independent investigation of this incident, to be conducted by a panel of civilian firearms instructors and gun safety experts,” Gottlieb stated. “This will eliminate any possibility or future assertion that the TSA whitewashed this incident and used the pilot as a scapegoat to preserve unsafe regulations.

“Conversely,” he added, “such an investigation by non-government experts who are also not connected to APSA or the airlines could determine, without bias and free from any influence or coercion, whether the pilot was handling his firearm safely, or in an unsafe manner. We want the truth, and unlike they say in the movies, we believe the American public can handle the truth.”

-END-


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Copyright © 2008 Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, All Rights Reserved.
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
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email: InformationRequest@ccrkba.org

I couldn;t agree more with you, Benjamin, but, as I said, there's a madness to their (TSA's) method:

The airline pilot is not a trained law enforcement officer. Yes, many of them are ex-military pilots, but the preceeding sentence still applies. The TSA has trained them well enough to (hopefully) protect the cockpit. In the eyes of the airline industry, the cockpit is the key to the safety of all the passengers. Some passengers may get harmed, for example, in their seats or in the aisles, but ALL will be harmed if the cockpit is breached and won.

So.....their reasoning is: the pilot's job is to fly the plane. THat's all, just fly the plane safely. In order to ensure that they can do that from point A to point B, they must have a secure cockpit. Whatever happens beyond the cockpit door is not their concern (sounds terrible, I know, but they have a primary function that cannot be interferred with), beyond the cockpit door is the concern of TSA Air Marshals, other armed officers, and well-abled passengers. Now....

....once the plane lands and is secure, the pilots can exit the cockpit. At that point, as someone pointed out, they don;t want untrained personnel (pilots) carrying firearms that are not secure and could be taken from them. By untrained, I mean what they mean: ex-military, weapons-trained, highly capable people who are NOT trained in all the aspects of law enforcement.

I know it sounds a little crazy, but this is their reasoning, for whatever it's worth. I'm speaking here, not from "the inside", but from close enough to eavesdrop, if that makes sense.

The fact is, an accidental discharge occurred. Even if pilots were allowed to carry firearms, unlocked, whereever they went, accidental discharges will occurr, from time to time. So, regardless of the TSA policy to lock firearms, it has nothing to do with ADs. Now, the way they're required to lock the firearm and the devices used to do so, are of course relevant to ADs.

Ideally it would be best if every plane had it's own security force and the pilot was just a pilot. I think that might be the most preferable way to get the job done, and I am sure most pilots would prefer letting someone else focus on securing the airplane so they can do what they are supposed to do. My experience is that, as with ships, pilots are responsible for the total operation of the aircraft. If something goes wrong on the airplane, the pilot is informed of the issue and has the final say about what will be done. This includes dealing with unruly passengers from time to time.

If they are going to start excluding the guy flying the plane from the security equation, then I think they are just asking for something bad to happen. I can appreciate the cockpit limitations on weapons availability, right up to the point where armed assailants are outside the door taking out their frustrations on the flight attendants and the passengers. I would prefer a more proactive response from people who are responsible for the whole welfare of the flight, not just concerned with getting from point a to point b.

I was reading an article written by a security expert about this situation on another website and it made some good sense to me. The basic point is why pilots are being armed to deal with situations they're not trained to deal with.

http://peternbiddle.wordpress.com/2008/0...ably-the-pilot/

In my experience, the pilot IS concerned with everything on the plane. The point A to B is TSA's deal....and they're right. In my experience, these pilots aren't wimps who just want to sit in the cockpit, no no....they're smart.

Here's how smart they are: There is a terrorist attack on the plane. The pilot, knowing the co-pilot can fly the plane and he can handle these humpheads better than ANY air marshall or federal agent, stays inside the cockpit. Why? Because he's smart.....very smart. He knows that if he's overtaken, that leaves only the co-pilot.

Now, the co-pilot is very smart too. He knows he can handle any situation that arises in life. Still, he stays in the cockpit. Why? Because he's very smart. He knows that if he's overtaken, that leaves only the terrorist to fly the plane. And...he knows terrorists are terrible pilots.

Very smart these pilots and TSA people. THey think inside the box - where ALL the historical and empirical information available to us resides.

In response to having a security force to handle security and pilots to just the fly the plane, well that's EXACTLY what they already have. Now, there isn't an air marshall on every flight - they take them off when there are armed federal agents flying. As I mentioned before, ALL federal agents have received training on what to do in the event of a highjacking. I'm NOT saying there is an armed person on every single flight, but the on overwhelming majority of flights they're there. I know this.

THe pilot does have the final say on what happens on his flight. He and the co-pilot are apprised and aware of everything of significance happening on that plane.

Unless there's internal memoranda saying otherwise, the TSA and airline industry has yet to remove the pilot from the equation. They ARE the equation.

Lastly, as I said before, the pilots are concerned with getting from A to B and EVERYTHING inbetween, but remember, they're smart people. Using Robert Duvall's quip from the movie "Colors" (but applying it differently, I'd say "Hey Bill, let's put the plane on autopilot and go out there and SAVE THAT GUY that's being attacked by those humpheads". "Frank, why don;t we stay in here and SAVE THEM ALL"

A little gun safety regarding modern pistols with a decocking lever.....
Some people think, or do not know better, that it is alright to ride the hammer down as you would a 1911 style pistol on these SA/DA pistols. When in fact you can do it, and even switch the safety on, it does not fully disengage the transfer bar......
You may not be able to pull the trigger (safety's on remember?) but a good, hard sharp blow (oooops, gun dropped) to the hammer can bring it foward with enough force to hit the partally dropped transfer bar to cause a discharge. By using to decocking lever, which really is what it was designed for now wasn't it, the transfer bar is fully dropped out if position and the hammer is fully down so even if dropped there will be no discharge. Just 2¢ of advice....carry on

-Bill Liptak

The article pretty much spells out my expectation for arming pilots, which is that if you are going to put anybody on a plane with a gun, they ought to have a certain level or demonstrated proficiency with that firearm in that context so that the question of response vs responsibility is moot.

Otherwise, let's agree that every flight should have an armed security contingent aboard it, who's purpose is not only to deal with threats in the cabin, but also to provide a threat response defending the cockpit, that way, pilots won't need to worry about being armed. The flight crew can then enter the plane separately and isolated from the cabin, and once in flight, no one in the cabin can get to the flight crew or the cockpit. Sure, it might cut down on the conveniences a bit, but it would also solve a major problem with access to the flight crew such as what occurred on 9/11. Then it doesn't matter if the flight crew are armed or not anymore, the most that a terrorist could hope to do is blow the plane up mid air. That is something neither the flight crew nor any armed contingent is going to be able to stop anyways.

If you aren't going to physically isolate the cockpit from the cabin, then you have to consider that there is virtually no door, and therefore no isolation between the cabin and the cockpit area, as any door you put in can and will be breached rather easily. That being the case, and the fact that there is no armor in the walls of the cockpit preventing terrorists from simply shooting through upon first denial, the notion that the pilot and co-pilot are somehow going to remain separated from any terrorist activity in the cabin is senseless, and the need for armed response by them to any threat whether behind the door or after a breach is undifferentiated. Therefore, to say that they need only be armed and ready to respond once they are in the cockpit and behind a veil of security is nothing more than an illusion, and basing a training plan on that premise is to invite disaster.

In short, the TSA's approach to cockpit secuity is really not much better than it always has been.

I would much prefer that anyone who's going to be armed and responsible for the security aboard a commercial flight better dang well have adequate training regardless of their position aboard the plane. To say that the pilot/co-pilot should only have training necessary to deal with a threat within the cockpit seems to me rather irresponsible. I am not saying that pilots don't have the propensity to learn how to respond properly, only that the directives governing their training and allowable response to a threat are ludicrous and unrealistic in such an environment. If they wait to deal with a threat until a breach is imminent, then in my opinion they've already been defeated. Either you arm them and train them to do the whole job, or else you make the cockpit wall bulletproof and unbreachable short of blowing the plane apart. This middle ground is just a stop gap to appease the public and give the flight crew the equivalent of a teddy bear.